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Abstract: The Nigeria budgetary practices have been characterised with indiscipline and flagrant 
disregards to budgetary rules and procedures. This culture has been substantially attributed to the long 
years of military rule. This paper juxtaposes military and civilian regimes in Nigeria with respect to 
adherence to budgetary estimates.  Eight years for each regime were purposively considered (1991 –
1998 and 1999-2006). Time series data were retrieved from secondary sources and analyzed using 
simple variances, percentages, descriptive statistics as well as independent T-Test. The paper found 
that although budget discipline under democratic regime is arithmetically higher that budget 
discipline under military system, the difference is not statistically significant. It was therefore 
recommended that since budget is a law (appropriation Act); it should be accorded the same respect 
like any other act of the National Assembly as a justification for the democratic tenet of the rule of 
law. To that end budget implementation and control should be judiciously enforced with a view to 
achieving the lofty objectives that accompanies each year’s budget, as well as reduce the negative 
pressure that budget indiscipline engenders. 
Keywords: government administration; resource management; financial indiscipline and public 
sector reform 
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1. Introduction  
The superior performance of every economy is largely determined by efficient 
fiscal and monetary policies management. These two macro economic variables are 
in most countries congregated in the national budget. Besides, being a critical 
planning and control device, budget gives expression to the macro economic 
objectives of the government as well as the fiscal strategies for their attainment. 
However, the extent to which such objectives are achieved depends to a great 
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extent on the discipline exercised by government in the implementation and control 
of the budget.  It is also recognized that the attainment of budget can be thwarted 
by external economic forces uncontrollable for an organization or nation; many 
aspects of a budget are controllable by the operators- hence discipline is required.  
Budget discipline connotes the extent to which an institution or nation stays within 
the budget or simply, the ratio of budgetary expenditure to actual expenditure, as 
different from fiscal discipline which is the ratio of budget deficit to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Lack of budget discipline has been identified as one of 
the main factors accounting for the disappointing budgetary performance of many 
countries in Africa (Lienert & Sarraf, 2001). Indiscipline in the management of 
resources is iniquitous to the economic progress of any nation irrespective of the 
nature of government (Military or Civilian).  
In Nigeria, the budgetary processes are said to be characterised by lack of 
discipline and flagrant disregard for budgetary procedures leading to the 
unimpressive performance of Nigerian economy (Obidegwu, 2005). This reported 
financial and fiscal rascality of the Nigerian federal government has been 
substantially attributed to the long years of military rule, which to a great extend 
associate budget indiscipline to the type of government in power (Orebiyi & 
Ogochukwu, 2005).  
It is to this end that this paper attempts to investigate the budgetary practices of 
Nigeria at different regimes (Military and Democracy). The paper is predicated on 
the proposition that there is no significant difference between military autocracy 
and civilian democracy in terms of adherence to budgetary estimate. The study is 
intended to emphasize the fact that the sustainability of the Nigerian nascent 
democracy is dependent on the delivery of tangible dividends to a larger majority 
of the citizens, and one way of doing that is through discipline in the management 
of scarce recourses. 
The rest of the paper is organised into the following sub headings; section 2.0/2.1 
undertakes a theoretical discourse of military and civilian administration as well as 
an X-ray of budget discipline under military and civilian regimes. In section 3.0, 
the methodology of the study was captured, giving way for data presentation, 
analyses and discussion of result which took their turn in section 4.0. The paper 
was concluded in section 5.0 after making recommendations as considered 
necessary.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Military and Civilian Administrations: A Theoretical Discourse 
As a way of establishing the foundational thesis of this paper, it is important we 
engage in a theoretical analysis of both the military and the civilian 
administrations. Though our focus is the Nigerian State, we still consider a general 
discourse of the basic tenets of both administrations as a necessity without 
necessarily avoiding the Nigerian historical experiments of the military and the 
civilian administrations.  First, the concepts of power and authority are central 
concepts that distinguish the two administrations. For the military, power is a 
fundamental factor given that no organized electoral process serves as the basis of 
the enthronement of military form of government. Frederick (1963) construed 
power as the capacity to modify the conduct of others in a manner that is desired. 
Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) conceived power as the process of affecting the policy 
options of others through the actual or threatened use of sanctions for non-
conformity to prescribed behavioural pattern. From the definitions above, power 
implies the coercive method employed by those not entitled to one’s obedience to 
get one to do what one does not want to do. Their rules and regulations are 
complied with not because they are legitimate but because sanctions are provoked 
to compel compulsory obedience. This is peculiar to the military system of 
government. 
Authority, on the other hand, entails willingness to obey given that the one 
demanding for obedience has the consent of the people. For Carter (1979), 
authority implies force exercised or capable of being exercised with the general 
approval of those concerned.  For Raphael (1990), when we speak of power in a 
social context, we are usually thinking of a specific kind of ability, the ability to 
make other people do what one wants them to do while to have authority to do 
something is to have the right to do it.  
Another important factor that distinguishes the military from its civilian 
counterpart is the suspension of the constitution. The military operates by decrees 
to which obedience is by coercion while the civilian government operates within 
the purview of the constitution to which obedience is based on right to demand it 
and there is a legitimate ground for its enforcement. Unfortunately, the Nigerian 
constitution has been a brain work of the several military regimes. For instance, 
scholars argue that the 1999 constitution lack moral authority (the legitimacy 
question) and legal validity because its conception and promulgation lack 
legitimacy, having been introduced by the previous military government 
(Ogowewo, 2000) 
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Military is identified as the government of men and not of law because its 
practitioners (Soldiers) are men not trained in the art of politics and 
constitutionality but rather in warfare situations where the lives of the opponents 
are not valued. 
The first military coup in Nigeria led to the death of several Northerners including 
the then Prime Minister Sir Abubukar Tafawa Balewa and several other politicians.  
Since then, the Nigerian state has witnessed several coups leading to the loss of 
lives. Thus, given the evils with which the military terminates incumbent political 
processes, scholars in search of the end to military rule in Nigeria discovered the 
theoretical underpinnings of military incursion into politics. Obi (1999) links the 
cause of the military in Africa to weakness of the political structures and process in 
the post-colonial states. 
The poor political structure of the First Republic gave birth to the first military 
incursion, led by Major Nzeogwu, into Nigerian young democracy. Major 
Nzeogwu gave a justification for his attack on the politicians as an attempt to 
remove the political profiteers and swindlers from power (First, 1976). The 
perceived crises in Nigerian politics seemed to be the basis for military incursion as 
the different military regimes justified their interventions as patriotic acts based on 
national interests (Obi, 1999). The different military regimes pledged to put an end 
to corruption, misrule and indiscipline, but in reality they went on to legitimize 
what they spoke against. The first military coup, January 15 1966, was the 
beginning of a journey into a 29-year military rule in Nigeria, with a brief hiatus 
between 1979 and 1983. From then till 1999, the history of governance in Nigeria 
was the history of excessive militocratic exercise of naked political power void of 
legitimacy until the enthronement of democratic governance administered by the 
civilian administrators who are expected to be the representatives of the people. 
Obviously, the modus operandi of the two administrations differs. A military 
administration emerges through a forceful seizure of power while a civilian 
government is a product of the electoral process where the peoples’ preference for 
who should lead them is expressed.  
The concept of opposition parties is foreign to military government. An opposition 
party, for the military, is an enemy of the state that must be executed. But for 
civilian government, opposition parties are part of the game of politics. Even the 
people can rise and demand for accountability and transparency from their leaders 
under civilian government while such is treated with disdain under military 
government. In other words, the people have the power to change their 
representatives in the next elections under civilian government while military 
government is not a product of the peoples’ willing consensus. According to Laski 
(1978), every government must submit itself to the judgement of those who feel the 
consequences of its act. While the civilian government can readily, whether willing 
or unwillingly, submit itself to the critical evaluation of those who suffer the effects 
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of its policies, military government resort to naked power in clamming down all 
oppositions.  
 
2.2. Budget Discipline under Military and Civilian Administration  
Budget still remains the single most important policy document in the hand of 
government. This is because budget gives expression to the fiscal intentions of the 
government in managing an economy. According to Olaoye (2010), public sector 
budget besides assembling the projected revenue and expenditure of government, 
addresses the allocation of resources to achieve societal goals; serves as an 
instrument for managing economic crisis and uncertainty, serves as an instrument 
of policy direction for the economy; it also represents a tool for defining 
government economic and societal focus as well as an instrument for economic 
management.  However, budget is not an end by itself; it is a means to an end, 
hence, the call for discipline at all stages of the budgetary process to ensure the 
achievement of budget objectives (Olomola, 2009) 
Budget discipline connotes the extent to which an institution or nation stays within 
the budget or better still the ability of a government to confine itself to the limit of 
expenditure in the approved budget or supplementary budget (Aruwa, 2004). It is 
measured as the ratio of budgetary expenditure to actual expenditure, as different 
from fiscal discipline which is the ratio of budget deficit to the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). They are three principal areas or dimensions of budget discipline 
according to (Oshisami, 1992 & Omolehinwa, 2001) these include; adherence to 
stated budgeting policies without wavering; adherence to budget calendar in the 
development, approval, implementation and monitoring as well as adherence to 
approved estimates in the appropriation act. These three levels of discipline are 
crucial for the effective working of the budget, and a breach in any level constitutes 
indiscipline. Indiscipline in the management of resources is iniquitous to the 
economic progress of any nation irrespective of the nature of government (Military 
or Civilian).  Observation in most literature is that budget indiscipline is a 
fundamental characteristic of budget practices of most countries in Sub-Sahara 
African countries including Nigeria (Aruwa, 2004; Obidegwu, 2005; Olaoye, 
2010). However, Obidegwu (2005) attributed this callous fiscal behaviour to the 
degeneration in governance and the increasing lack of coherence between 
government policies and the budget. This suggests that fiscal indiscipline will be 
reduced if policies are integrated into the budget.  It could also be deduced that the 
effectiveness of any budgetary system is dependent on the working of the 
government and the sincerity of her programmes.  
In Nigeria, fiscal irresponsibility or budget indiscipline has been observed and 
identified to be one of the serious problems of budgetary process. According to 
Aruwa (2004), the principle of strict budget discipline has evaded the 
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implementation of the federal budget. This observation has been corroborated by a 
number of literatures. For instance, Orebiyi and Ugochukwu (2005) related budget 
implementation failures in Nigeria to non-adherence to rules and control 
mechanisms associated with long years of military rule. 
Again, Orebiyi and Ugochukwu (2005) lamented the continuation of this bad 
practice of non-implementation of budget to the letter in the new democratic 
Nigeria. It was this worrisome fiscal management that led to the inclusion of 
budget discipline improvement in the Obasanjo’s public sector reform agenda 
(Ahmed, 2007). This was to be done through effort to establish an annual budget 
framework and guideline to be followed by all tiers of government as embodied in 
the fiscal responsibility Act 2007. The extent of compliance and its effectiveness is 
still a moot. Furthermore, Olomola (2009) studying strategies and consequences of 
budgetary reforms in Nigeria noted that the budget process has always been fraught 
with monumental abuses whether under military or civilian regimes. 
The military modus operandi undermines the constitution, uses ad hoc procedures 
in budgeting and celebrates arbitrary budget estimations, as against the civilian 
regime where the budget is made to pass through constitutional and legal 
procedures. However, the theoretical dichotomy between the military and the 
civilian administration do not seem to be reflected in the overall budgetary 
performance hence, monumental abuses are always reported in both military and 
civilian regimes. This situation is further buttressed by Olaoye (2010) who 
studying budget discipline in government, asserted that from whatever angle one 
looks at the subject of budget discipline, the Nigerian nation still has a long way to 
go. From the forgoing, it seems conclusive that budget indiscipline is the order of 
the day whether in the military or civilian administration. However, an empirical 
analysis would be a better proof of the position, which none of the literature above 
has provided. This is in fact the justification and relevance of this study. 
 
3. Methodology 
This paper adopted both qualitative and quantitative approaches in explaining the 
budgetary practices in both the Military and the Civilian regimes in Nigeria. The 
quantitative aspect of the analyses involves the use of secondary data obtained 
from Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Reports; (2007, 2008) and the Central Bank 
of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin. Simple variance, percentage analyses, descriptive 
statistics as well as independent T- Test were employed for analyses, using MS 
Excel and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to aid the analyses. 
Budget Discipline was operationally defined as the ratio of budgetary expenditure 
to actual expenditure while budget variance is operationally the difference between 
budget expenditure and actual expenditure. Mathematically; 
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Budget Discipline = Budget Expenditures 
                          Actual Expenditure 
Budget Expenditure Variance = Budget Expenditure-Actual Expenditure  
4. Data Presentation and Analyses 
This section presents the data use in this study with the analyses; the analyses 
undertaking here include; Variance analysis; percentage analyses as well as the 
independent sampled T-test. 
 
Table 1. Variance and percentage analyses 
1 
Year 
2 
Budget Exp 
(N,M) 
3 
Actual Exp (N,M) 
4 
Variance (N,M) 
5 
Budget 
Discipline 
6 
Budget 
Indiscipline 
7% of 
Variation 
from the 
Budget 
1991 38,666.40 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
66,584.40 -27,918.00 0.58 1.72 72 
1992 52,035.90 92,797.40 -40,761.50 0.56 1.78 78 
1993 112,100.50 191,228.90 -79,128.40 0.59 1.71 71 
1994 110,200.00 160,893.20 -50,693.20 0.68 1.46 46 
1995 153,496.00 248,768.10 -95,272.10 0.62 1.62 62 
1996 189,000.00 337,217.60 -148,217.60 0.56 1.78 78 
1997 276,723.20 428,215.20 -151,492.00 0.65  1.55 55 
1998 367,917.00 487,113.40 -119,196.40 0.76 1.32 32 
1999 358,103.20 947,690.00 -589,586.80 0.38 2.65 165 
2000 664,735.30 701,059.40 -36,324.10 0.95 1.05 5 
2001 1,752,778.70 1,018,025.60 734,753.10 1.72 0.58 -42 
2002 1,018,155.90 1,018,155.80 0.10 1.00 1.00 0 
2003 122,556.60 1,226,200.00 -1,103,643.40 0.10 10.01 901 
2004 1,302,231.00 1,426,200.00 -123,969.00 0.91 1.10 10 
2005 1,799,938.20 1,822,100.00 -22,161.80 0.99 1.01 1 
2006 1,842,587.70 2,026,000.00 -183,412.30 0.91 1.10 10 
Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report; (2007, 2008); Central Bank of Nigeria 
Statistical Bulletin, December 2002, Vol. 13; Annual Audited Accounts of the Auditor General 
of Nigeria. Columns 4-7 were computed by the researcher. 
Table 1 shows a 16 year variance and percentage analyses of the federal government 
annual expenditure. The variance analyses result (column 4) show that for the sixteen 
years period covered, the federal government has recorded mostly adverse variances 
except for two years (2001 and 2002) where favourable variance where recorded. The 
percentage of variations from the budget (column 7) ranges from -42% to 0% 
(favourable years) and 1% to a record high of 901% (adverse years). Several factors 
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might have accounted for the enormity of these variances. Such factors may include 
but not limited to poor budget planning, faulty budget assumptions leading to 
estimation errors, inflation, external variables affecting national annual budget, 
corruption which is the chief variable of budget indiscipline to mention but a few. 
The variance analyses result also show that eight years before the return to civilian 
democracy (1991-1998 military era) the actual budget expenditure consistently 
exceeded the targeted expenditure depicting poor discipline, hence the variance curve 
(figure 1) lie below the horizontal axis indicating adverse variances throughout the 
period with a mean discipline of 0.6240 and a standard deviation of 0.06849 (see table 
2). Eight years after the enthronement of democracy (1999-2006), there seems to be 
an arithmetic improvement with respect to adherence to budget discipline. The period 
recorded two years of favourable variances (2001 and 2002) and six years of adverse 
variance including a record high adverse variance of N1103643.40M representing 
about 901% extra budgetary expenditure in 2003.  This is reflected in a higher mean 
discipline of 0.8698 but with a higher standard deviation of 0.47823 (Table 2). A 
higher standard deviation during democratic period indicates that the variances were 
more erratic than the military era as depicted by the variance curve in figure 1. 
Figure 1. Budget Variance Chart (N,M) 
Source: Charted by the authors using micro soft excel 
Furthermore, the variance analyses reveals a high proclivity to spend off the budget 
(budget indiscipline) during transition or election years as demonstrated by the 1999 
and 2003 colossal off budget expenditures of 165% and 901% respectively. These 
budgetary behaviours again suggest the problem of poor budget planning or faulty 
budgetary allocation. Transitions or elections are not accidental programs; one would 
have expected their cost to have been adequately factored into the year’s budget either 
in the appropriation acts or supplementary appropriation acts, thus, reducing the extra 
budgetary expenditure to the barest minimum if not totally eliminated. A situation 
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where expenditure for the year is overshot by about nine times the target cannot be 
justified by any economic or financial models except to confirm the non-alignment of 
economic political objectives with budgetary allocations as observed by Aruwa, 
(2004). 
Table 2. Group Statistics 
 Type of 
Government N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Budget 
Discipline 
Military 
Government 
8 0.6240 0.06849 0.02421 
Civilian 
Democracy 
8 0.8698 0.47823 0.16908 
Source: Computed by the authors using SPSS 
Furthermore, in order to test the hypothesis of this study, an Independent Sample T-
test was conducted to compare budget discipline under the two regimes (military and 
democracy). From the result (table 3), the Levene’s test for equality of variance 
indicates that the data violates the assumption of equal variances since the sig. value 
of 0.048 does not exceed 0.05. The T-test for equality of mean has a value of -1.439 
with a sig value of 0.192. Since the sig value is greater than 0.05 it means that the 
mean difference between the two independent scores is not significant.  
By this result, it is unsafe to reject the research hypothesis. We therefore conclude 
that there is no statistically significant difference between budget discipline under 
the military regimes and budget discipline under the civilian regime. 
Table 3. Independent Sample Test 
Sources: T-Test result computed from SPSS  
  Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  
F Sig. T Df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Budget 
Disciplin
e 
Equal variances 
assumed 
4.710 .048 -1.439 14 .172 -.24581 .17081 -.61216 .12053 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
-1.439 7.287 .192 -.24581 .17081 -.64650 .15488 
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5. Conclusion  
The issue of discipline in the management of recourses cannot be over emphasised. 
This is because mismanagement, waste or indiscipline not only frustrate the 
achievement of budgetary objectives but is also iniquitous to the economy 
irrespective of whether the government is military or civilian. This paper had 
applied both theoretical exploration and simple quantitative techniques to compare 
budget discipline under military autocracy and civilian democracy. The findings 
are here under summarised; 
1 Budget indiscipline is a characteristic feature of the Nigeria budgetary process. 
2 There is no statistically significant difference between budget discipline under 
military regime and budget discipline under civilian democracy in Nigeria.  
3 There is high proclivity to over spend during transition years (as evidenced in 
1999 and 2003) than it is for other years.  
From the findings, it is therefore not surprising why the Nigeria budgetary 
performance had been describe as disappointing as it has contributed to further under 
developing the nation and adding to the poverty crises. If this culture of fiscal rascality 
in the Nigerian budgetary process is not fought, it will not only continue to undermine 
our developmental effort but will also threaten the sustainability of Nigeria nascent 
democracy given the country’s mono-product status. Worst still, is the fact that with 
respect to budgetary practices, the dichotomy between military and civilian regimes is 
only theoretical. Democracy anywhere is associated with the rule of law, probity and 
accountability among other tenets. It should not only guarantee prudence management 
of resources but ensure that there are managed for the common good of a greater 
number of the citizens. 
It is to this end that we candidly recommend that the budget or the appropriation act 
should be accorded the same respect like any other act of the National Assembly as a 
justification for the democratic tenet of the rule of law. This will enable all stages of 
the budgetary process to be managed with a high sense of discipline and 
accountability, in order to guarantee the achievement of the lofty objectives that 
accompanies each year’s budget, as well as reduce the negative pressure that budget 
indiscipline engenders. 
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